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Abstract
What makes individuals conform or diverge after observing prosocial
or selfish behavior by others? We study experimentally how social com-
parison (observing a peer’s behavior) interacts with identity motives for
cooperation. Participants play two games. We increase the strength of the
identity motive by inducing subjects in a treatment condition to infer their
identity from behavior in the first game. Cooperators who observe a peer
defect donate 28% more to their unknown partner in the second game in
the treatment than in the control group. Our results are consistent with
the predictions of Bénabou and Tirole (2011), and show that the "sucker-
to-saint effect" identified by Jordan and Monin (2008) can have important
behavioral consequences.
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1. Introduction
There is substantial evidence that individuals tend to behave more prosocially
after observing others behave prosocially - and more selfishly after seeing others
acting selfishly: for example, this is evident in studies of charitable contributions
(e.g. Frey and Meier (2004), Croson and Shang (2008))1. Yet people do not
always follow others’ example, and sometimes they even seem to react against it.2
What makes individuals conform or diverge when it comes to prosocial behavior,
and to what extent? Understanding this seems crucial to designing incentives and
organizational structures, and implementing a broad range of public policies.3
One possible answer is that individuals choose actions to build and/or affirm
their identity (Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Bénabou and Tirole (2011)). This
identity motive then interacts with social comparison, leading sometimes to con-
formity and sometimes to divergence.4 To investigate this interaction empirically,
we need to be able to vary social comparison (the observed behavior of others), but
also the strength of the identity motive. We do this by designing an experiment in
which subjects play two games, where they can act prosocially or selfishly. In each
game, acting prosocially is socially efficient: it increases others’ payoffs more than
it decreases own payoff. Before the second game, subjects observe how another
subject behaved in the first game: this is the source of social comparison. To
vary the strength of the identity motive, we have a treatment condition in which
subjects, after the first game but before learning they will be playing a second
game, are induced to infer their identity from their choices in the first game. In
the control condition this induced identity inference step is absent. Individuals
may still, to some extent, infer their identity from their previous actions, but on
average they are less likely to think carefully about the identity implications of
behavior than in the treatment condition, where they have to answer a sequence
1See also, among others, Alpizar et al. (2008), Andreoni et al. (1998), Heldt (2005), Martin
and Randal (2008), Rothstein (2000), Shang and Croson (2009).
2For instance, in a study of charitable contributions, Cueva and Dessí (2012) find that the
average contribution of "followers" is higher after observing two leaders who donate zero, relative
to one leader who donates zero and one who donates a positive amount.
3For example, organizations routinely make decisions that affect the visibility and salience of
different individuals’ actions. Governments and government-funded agencies aiming to improve
health and environmental quality, or fight crime, carefully select information about individuals’
and groups’ behavior for their communication and advertising campaigns, and showcase stories
to inspire people to emulate certain behaviors and reject others.
4For models of either conformity or divergence see, for example, Akerlof (1982), Andreoni
(1989), Bernheim (1994), and Sugden (1984).
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of questions that focus attention specifically on this issue.
We can therefore explore how behavior in the second game varies with own
behavior in the first game, with the observed behavior of a peer, and with the
strength of the identity motive (control versus treatment condition). We test three
main hypotheses. First, we would expect to find that individuals who care more
about the well-being of others are more willing to behave prosocially. Thus, to
the extent that decisions in the first game reflect such individual differences in
"social" preferences, they should be correlated with decisions in the second game:
participants who are more generous in the first game should also be more generous
in the second. Second, we would expect behavior in the second game to be influ-
enced by the observed choice made by the peer in the first game. In particular,
the well-documented tendency for people to behave more (less) prosocially after
observing that others have behaved more (less) prosocially, noted above, suggests
a second prediction: individuals should be more generous in the second game after
observing a generous peer than after observing a selfish peer.
Our third and key hypothesis is that behavior in the second game will differ
between the control and the treatment condition. In the latter, after observing
a peer’s decision in the first game but before learning that they will play again
a similar game, participants are asked to rate themselves, and the peer, on two
dimensions: a seven-point generosity scale, going from "very selfish" to "very gen-
erous", and a seven-point rationality scale, going from "very rational" to "very
irrational". Those who behaved prosocially (henceforth called "givers" for ease
of exposition) can think of themselves as having a generous disposition. Those
who behaved selfishly (henceforth called "keepers") can think of themselves as
rational. Since the questions in the treatment condition have no impact on mon-
etary payoffs, standard economic models would not predict any treatment effect
on behavior in the second game. Bénabou and Tirole (2011), on the other hand,
would predict that, by making participants think more carefully about the iden-
tity implications of their actions, the treatment condition would increase what
they call "identity investments" - i.e., behavior aimed at increasing confidence in
one’s identity. If indeed this is the case, we might expect givers to be more gener-
ous in the treatment than in the control condition (because of investments in the
"generous" identity), and keepers to be less generous (because of investments in
the "rational" identity).
We find support for all three hypotheses. Givers are more generous than
keepers in the second game, in both the control and the treatment condition,
and in the face of congruent or divergent behavior by the observed peer. This
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is consistent with an important role for social preferences. The role of social
comparison is also important: participants are more generous in the second game
after observing a generous peer than after observing a selfish peer. This is true
for keepers as well as givers, in both the control and the treatment condition.
Our third main finding is that in the treatment condition, givers are more
generous and keepers more selfish, on average, than in the control condition. This
is consistent with an important role for identity investments. However, the only
statistically significant treatment effect is the greater generosity by givers who
have observed divergent behavior by the peer (i.e., a keeper).
To better understand this result, we go on to study subjects’ responses to
the ratings questions in the treatment condition. This reveals our fourth main
result: when we examine givers who have observed a keeper (i.e. the subjects
for whom we obtain a significant treatment effect), we find that those who have
rated themselves as more rational tend to behave more prosocially in the second
game. Those who have rated themselves as both more rational and more generous
give even more. Thus the significance of our treatment effect is not driven simply
by givers investing in a "generous" identity, as conjectured earlier: investments
are greater for a combined (and more appealing) identity as both generous and
rational. This interpretation is also consistent with our last finding, namely that
givers and keepers tend to agree in rating givers as more generous than keepers,
but givers think they are more rational than keepers while keepers think they are
more rational than givers. In other words, generosity has a clear, consensual mean-
ing for our participants, while the concept of rationality lends itself to different
interpretations: keepers can view themselves as more "rational", as we predicted,
but interestingly, givers can also view themselves as more "rational", perhaps by
thinking in terms of collective rationality. This has the advantage of yielding a
very positive self-image for givers; on the other hand, maintaining that positive
self-image requires consistency in subsequent behavior. Indeed, it is precisely the
givers who emphasize the rationality as well as generosity of prosocial behavior
who go on to behave more prosocially in the second game: noblesse oblige?
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We complete this section
with a review of the related literature in economics and psychology. Section 2
describes our experimental design and procedures. Our results are presented in
section 3. We discuss our findings and provide some conclusions in section 4.
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1.1. Literature Review
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature in economics and psy-
chology that insist on the importance of identity processes5. Akerlof and Kranton
(2000) were the first to highlight the importance of identity for economics, ar-
guing that individuals experience a loss of utility when they fail to conform to
the prescriptions of a chosen or ascribed identity. Bénabou and Tirole (2011)
have developed a model of identity investments in which individuals, who have
imperfect self-knowledge, infer their identity ("true nature") in part from obser-
vation of their past behavior. In psychology, this approach can be traced back
to Bem (1967), who argued that individuals tend to infer their dispositions from
their behavior. Our experimental methodology essentially manipulates the extent
to which subjects engage in such inference, by focusing their attention on the
identity implications of past behavior in the treatment condition (and not in the
control condition). This enables us to test the theoretical prediction from Bén-
abou and Tirole that identity investments should increase when identity concerns
are made more salient.
By asking individuals to reflect on their identity between two iterations of the
same game, we rely both on the fact that people’s identity is shaped by past
behavior, and on the fact that future behavior is shaped by past identity. In
other words, identity can serve as a bridge between past and future behavior,
and, as we show, the consistency of past and future behavior can be increased
by the crystallization of an identity, or the fact that the implications of past
behavior for one’s identity are drawn. Thus our paper is also related to recent work
in economics showing that individuals value consistency in a variety of contexts
(Falk and Zimmermann (2011)). Our study takes this line of research forward by
exploring the link between consistency and identity.
What identities or personality traits do individuals infer from their own choices
in an experimental game? Psychologists investigating this question have shown
that individuals who tend to act self-interestedly in such games see cooperators
as naïve or weak, whereas individuals who tend to act cooperatively see defectors
as unfair or mean (the “might-over-morality” phenomenon, see Liebrand, Jansen,
5Our main focus is on moral identity. There is now a substantial body of evidence in eco-
nomics showing that many people care about their moral identity: they do not like to per-
ceive themselves, and to be perceived by others, as unfair, selfish, opportunistic or dishonest.
See, among others, Andreoni and Bernheim (2009), Ariely, Bracha and Meier (2009), Broberg,
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007), Cueva and Dessí (2012), Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007),
Dana, Cain and Dawes (2006), Van der Weele (2012).
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Rijken, & Suhre, 1986). Thus individuals draw different conclusions based on
their own value orientation, and both groups are able to conclude that they pos-
sess a self-enhancing identity: defectors think they are strong and smart, while
cooperators think they are kind and sympathetic. Our results are similar in one
respect - both givers and keepers in our experiment are able to conclude that they
possess a self-enhancing identity - but also different in an interesting way: rather
than full separation of identities, with givers viewing themselves as generous and
keepers as rational, we observe separation along the generosity/selfishness identity
dimension, but competing claims to a "rational" identity.6
Our findings are therefore related to recent work by Butler, Giuliano and
Guiso (2012), who find that participants in trust game experiments have different
notions of what constitutes cheating in a trust exchange, correlated with values
instilled by their parents. While we do not investigate the link with parental
values, we find that participants in our experiment hold quite different notions of
what constitutes rational behavior, and these notions have a significant impact on
behavior.
Finally, our work is related to recent research suggesting that individuals may
moralize their behavior to compensate for feeling deficient after witnessing oth-
ers acting more self-interestedly. Jordan and Monin (2008) demonstrated in two
psychological studies that individuals boosted their moral self-image to justify not
acting in self-interested ways. In one study, participants witnessed a peer (really a
confederate) refuse to help out the experimenter on an optional task. Participants
rated themselves as more moral (and the other as less moral) if they had first been
induced to help out than if they had not. They also rated themselves as more
moral if they helped and witnessed the peer refuse than if they helped without
observing any peer. Jordan and Monin propose that after helping the experi-
menter, individuals witnessing the peer acting selfishly felt like suckers, and were
able to reduce this threat to their self-image by deciding instead that they were
better persons — and the refusing peer a worse person. That this tendency resulted
from self-threat was demonstrated by a second study where a “self-affirmation”
manipulation (Steele, 1988), in which individuals were induced to dwell on valued
aspects of their own personality, eliminated this “sucker-to-saint” effect. These
studies focused on self-report outcomes, and left open the question of behavioral
6Our results also differ in another important way: Liebrand et al. (1986) found that defectors
exposed to cooperators continued to defect, whereas cooperators exposed to defectors started
acting more individualistically. We do not find an analogous "race to the bottom" among our
experimental subjects.
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consequences. Our results show that ascribing past behavior to a more rational
and more generous nature can have a significant impact on future behavior, and
hence on economic outcomes.
2. Experimental Design and Procedures
Participants in our experiment were students at the University of Toulouse, and
all the experimental sessions were carried out in the Experimental Economics
Laboratory of the Toulouse School of Economics, using the software z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher (2007)). The details of the experimental instructions are available in the
Appendix.
Subjects were recruited by visiting the first or last five minutes of lectures
given to students in Economics, Business and Finance, and Law. We informed
students that they could, if they wished, volunteer to participate in experiments on
decision-making by registering on the Laboratory’s recruitment website. We told
them that sessions could take up to 90 minutes, inclusive of individual confidential
payments at the end of the experiment. Payments would depend on their decisions
and those of other participants.
Participants were randomly allocated to control or treatment sessions. At the
beginning of each session, each subject picked one out of a set of number identifiers,
which determined the computer that was allocated to him for the duration of the
experiment. At the end of the experiment, all participants left the laboratory
and waited outside; they were then called back individually to return the number
identifier and receive their earnings.
Throughout the experiment, earnings were referred to in terms of experimental
currency units or "points". Participants were told at the beginning of the session
that each point was worth 50 (Euro)cents.
In total, 256 subjects participated in the experiment, 120 in the control con-
dition and 136 in the treatment. In the control group, 46% of participants were
female, 58% were first-year undergraduates, and the average age was 20. In the
treatment group, the proportions were: 58% female, 48% first-year undergradu-
ates. The average age was again 20.
2.1. Treatment Condition
Subjects in this condition were allocated to groups of four, randomly and anony-
mously. Within each group, they were referred to neutrally as participants A, B,
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C and D. They all received an initial endowment of 12 units of experimental cur-
rency or "points", worth a total of 6 euros. They were told that the experiment
would proceed as follows. Participants A and B would decide, simultaneously
and without knowing the other’s decision, whether to keep all their endowment
or to send 4 points (2 euros) to the other. Participants C and D faced the same
decision. All amounts sent would be trebled by the experimenter; thus each sub-
ject could receive either zero or 12 points (6 euros), depending on his partner’s
decision. Payoffs were therefore interdependent within each pair and independent
between pairs in any group.
After the allocation decisions were made, each participant was reminded of his
choice (gave zero or gave four) and at the same time learned the choice made by
one of the players in the other pair in his group (e.g. A learned whether C had
given zero or four), without learning his own partner’s decision (which was only
revealed at the end of the experiment) and hence his payoff. In what follows, we
refer to the other player whose decision is observed as "the peer".
At this point, and without knowing that they would then face another decision,
subjects were asked six questions. In the first two, they were asked to rate their
peer, and themselves, on a seven-point scale going from 1 = very selfish to 7 =
very generous. The following two questions asked for the same ratings (peer and
self) on a scale going from 1 = very rational to 7 = very irrational. The last two
questions asked subjects to imagine an experiment where participants were given
the same endowment (12 points), and could freely allocate it between themselves
and their partner, who was facing the same choice (knowing that the amount sent
to the partner would be trebled by the experimenter). In question 5, they were
asked to estimate the minimum amount that a generous person would send. In
question 6, they were asked to estimate the maximum amount that a rational
person would send.
After answering these questions, subjects were told that they would now par-
ticipate in a second, similar experiment, which would be the last. They would
then receive their combined earnings from the two experiments. In this second
experiment, they would be re-matched, randomly and anonymously, so as to play
in another group of four, where none of the other players had belonged to their
group in the first experiment. Moreover, no participant in the new groups would
know how the other members of his group had played during the first experiment.
Subjects would receive a new endowment of 12 points for this second experiment,
and play the same allocation game as in the first, with one difference: they would
be free to allocate their endowment as they wished (to the nearest unit) between
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themselves and their partner. Amounts sent would be trebled by the experimenter,
as before.
After all the allocation decisions were made, subjects learned their payoffs
from each of the two experiments, and hence their total earnings.
2.2. Control Condition
In this condition, there was only one difference relative to the treatment: subjects
were asked to answer the six questions described above only at the very end (i.e.
after the two experiments). The questions were therefore very slightly modified so
as to remind subjects of the first experiment and obtain their ratings accordingly.
Similarly the questions about maximum and minimum amounts were phrased with
reference to the second experiment rather than an imagined experiment. In this
condition answering the questions could not have any impact on one’s choice in
the second experiment, because the questions came after the choice.
3. Results
We first describe the data, then go on to investigate our main hypotheses.
3.1. Descriptive Statistics
We begin by summarizing the data in Table 3.1. Roughly half of the participants
in both conditions chose to give a third of their endowment to their partner in
the first game, while the other half kept it all for themselves. Specifically, the
proportion of "givers" (who sent 4 units to their partner) was 51% in the control
and 45% in the treatment condition. As a consequence, the average amount sent,
shown in Table 3.1, was 2.033 in the control and 1.794 in the treatment. The
difference was not statistically significant.7
In both conditions, but crucially at different times, subjects were asked six
questions, described in detail in the Appendix. Four of these questions involved
rating the peer and the self on two dimensions, generosity and rationality. Average
ratings on the generosity dimension were very similar in the two conditions, with
peers being rated slightly more generous in the treatment than in the control
7Throughout the paper, p-values for pairwise comparisons refer to Mann-Whitney U-tests
unless otherwise stated.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Control Treatment Difference
Variable Mean (SD) Mean (SD) p-value
Amount sent 2.033 1.794 0.340
in first stage (2.008) (1.997)
Amount sent 2.125 2.162 0.679
in second stage (2.522) (2.842)
Minimum sent 4.167 4.140 0.751
if generous (2.059) (2.486)
Maximum sent 4.133 3.743 0.279
if rational (3.462) (3.455)
Self-rating 3.925 3.949 0.889
(generosity) (1.788) (1.421)
Peer-rating 3.867 4.022 0.684
(generosity) (1.815) (1.594)
Self-rating 2.717 2.478 0.310
(rationality) (1.562) (1.333)
Peer-rating 3.633 3.243 0.103
(rationality) (1.883) (1.745)
Generosity rating: 1= very selfish; 7 = very generous
Rationality rating: 1 = very rational; 7 = very irrational
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group. Average ratings on the rationality dimension were quite similar, with both
peers and the self being rated a little less rational in the treatment group.
Average amounts were very similar in the two conditions when answering the
question about the minimum that a generous person would give (a little over four
units). When deciding the maximum that a rational person would give, subjects’
answers were on average somewhat lower in the treatment, but the difference is
not significant.
In the second game, while almost all possible allocations were observed, the
average amount sent was 2.125 units in the control and 2.162 in the treatment
condition (i.e. a little over the average amount sent in the first game).
3.2. Main Results
We begin by analyzing behavior in the second game, then examine participants’
answers to the questions about generosity and rationality. In our analysis, we
distinguish between "givers" (who chose the option to send four units to their
partner in the first game) and "keepers" (who chose to keep all their endowment
in the first game).
3.2.1. Behavior in Game 2
Table 3.2 investigates our first two hypotheses. On average, givers sent 3.164 units,
while keepers sent 1.216 units. The difference is highly significant, and supports
our first hypothesis concerning the role of social preferences: individuals who gave
more in the first game also gave more in the second game. The table then shows
the mean amount sent in the second game as a function of the observed peer’s
behavior in the first game: we find that subjects sent significantly more in the
second game after observing a giver (2.525 units) than after observing a keeper
(1.799 units). This result supports our second hypothesis concerning the role
of social comparison: individuals tend to behave more prosocially (cooperatively)
after observing more prosocial behavior by peers.
Our third and key hypothesis is that in the treatment condition, givers send
more and keepers send less, on average, than in the control condition. The means
presented in Table 3.3 are consistent with the hypothesis. However, the p-values
from the Mann-Whitney U-tests reported in the last line of the table show that the
treatment effect is only statistically significant for one group: givers who observe
a keeper. Moreover, the difference in means for this group implies a larger effect.
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Table 3.2: Behavior in Game 2: Hypotheses 1 & 2
Mean amount sent p-value
Hypothesis 1 Givers Keepers
3.164 1.216 0.000
Hypothesis 2 Peer: giver Peer: keeper
2.525 1.799 0.042
To better understand this result, we go on to examine subjects’ responses to the
ratings questions.
Table 3.3: Mean amounts sent in Game 2: Hypothesis 3
Givers Keepers
Peer Giver Keeper Giver Keeper
Means
Control 3.346 2.486 1.629 1.000
Treatment 3.750 3.172 1.517 0.826
p-values
0.770 0.020 0.203 0.281
3.2.2. Generosity and Rationality
Tables 3.4 to 3.6 summarize the answers to our questions about generosity and
rationality. Table 3.4 shows the average ratings for the self and the peer on the
generosity scale, going from 1 = very selfish to 7 = very generous.
For the treatment condition, we see that givers who have a keeper as a peer
have an average self -rating of 4.759, while their average rating for the peer is
2.414. Thus on average givers rate themselves as substantially more generous
than keepers, and the difference is significant (p = 0.000). Keepers who have
a giver as a peer share this view: their average self -rating is 2.724, while their
average rating for the peer is 5.483 (p = 0.000).
Table 3.5 presents average ratings for the self and the peer on the (ir)rationality
scale, going from 1 = very rational to 7 = very irrational. For the treatment con-
dition, we find that the average self -rating for keepers who have a giver as a peer
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Table 3.4: Generosity: mean ratings
Self Peer: Keeper Peer: Giver Peer: Keeper Peer: Giver
Control Treatment
Self-rating
Givers 4.857 5.038 4.759 5.219
Keepers 3.000 2.800 3.326 2.724
Peer-rating
Givers 2.086 5.077 2.414 5.188
Keepers 2.917 5.400 3.304 5.483
1 = very selfish 7 = very generous
Table 3.5: Rationality: mean ratings
Self Peer: Keeper Peer: Giver Peer: Keeper Peer: Giver
Control Treatment
Self-rating
Givers 3.000 2.885 3.103 2.813
Keepers 2.292 2.600 1.913 2.379
Peer-rating
Givers 4.171 2.769 4.000 3.344
Keepers 2.208 4.714 2.000 4.345
1 = very rational 7 = very irrational
is 2.379, while their average rating for the peer is 4.345, implying that keepers
indeed view givers as much more irrational than themselves (p = 0.000). Interest-
ingly though, givers do not share this view: givers who have a keeper as a peer
tend to rate keepers as more irrational than themselves (average self-rating: 3.103;
average peer-rating: 4.000), although the difference is not statistically significant
(p = 0.104).
Overall, the evidence from self ratings and peer ratings shows that, as pre-
dicted, givers view themselves as significantly more generous than keepers, while
keepers view themselves as significantly more rational than givers. In addition,
we see that givers and keepers agree that givers are more generous, but they dis-
agree on who is more rational: keepers think that keeping all the money is more
rational, while givers seem to find that there are good rational reasons for sending
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some of the money. This difference also emerges in the answers to the question
asking what is the maximum amount that a rational person would send to the
partner, summarized in Table 3.6. In the treatment condition, the mean answer
for givers is substantially higher than for keepers (5.966 versus 2.370; p = 0.000;
5.125 versus 2.172; p = 0.000).
Table 3.6: Mean thresholds: Maximum amount a rational person would send, and
Minimum amount a generous person would send
Self Peer: Keeper Peer: Giver Peer: Keeper Peer: Giver
Control Treatment
Max if rational
Givers 5.143 4.538 5.966 5.125
Keepers 3.958 2.943 2.370 2.172
Min if generous
Givers 4.143 4.846 4.207 5.000
Keepers 4.292 3.600 3.630 3.931
These results suggest that keepers, as we conjectured, rationalized their be-
havior in the first game as rationally selfish. Givers, on the other hand, were
able to rationalize their behavior as both more generous and at least as rational
as keepers’ behavior, perhaps by thinking in terms of collective rationality. This
yielded a more appealing identity, which may explain why identity effects were
then stronger for these subjects in the second game.
For participants in the treatment condition, we further explored this inter-
pretation by examining the relationship between the amount sent in the second
game, and the answers given to the ratings questions. Tables 3.7 − 3.10 present
the results of Tobit regressions for the four different groups in the treatment con-
dition. The dependent variable is the amount sent in the second game. The
variable "generosity" measures the subject’s self-rating on the generosity scale.
We constructed the "rationality" variable by recoding our rationality scale from
1 = very irrational to 7 = very rational. Thus "rationality" measures the subject’s
self-rating on this recoded scale. We normalized both variables to ease interpreta-
tion of coefficients8. The variable "genrational" is the product of these normalized
ratings and captures the interaction between "generosity" and "rationality". The
8Let X be the raw self-rating score: we use the normalized score X′ = (X− µˆ)/σˆ, where µˆ is
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answers to the last two questions are coded as "mingen" (the minimum amount
that a generous person would send) and "maxrat" (the maximum amount that a
rational person would send).
Table 3.7: Tobit Regression for Amount Sent in Second Game: Givers Who Ob-
served a Keeper
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. t p-value
Generosity -0.630 0.386 -1.63 0.116
Rationality 0.785** 0.376 2.09 0.048
Genrational 0.702* 0.354 1.99 0.059
Mingen -0.233 0.197 -1.19 0.248
Maxrat -0.042 0.103 -041 0.685
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Obs: 29
Table 3.7 shows the results for the group we are most interested in: givers
who observe a keeper. For this group, the coefficient for generosity (estimated
at the mean for rationality) is not significant, but the coefficient for rationality
(estimated at the mean for generosity) is positive and significant, with individuals
who rated themselves as more rational donating more in the second game. More-
over, the interaction term is positive, and significant at the 10% level (p = 0.059):
the greatest donations in the second game thus came from people who had rated
themselves both rational and generous in the first game (where all givers had ob-
jectively given the same amount), and the lowest donations came from individuals
who rated themselves as generous but irrational.
Table 3.8 shows that for givers who observed another giver, two effects were sig-
nificant. Individuals gave more in the second game after stating a higher threshold
for the maximum amount that a rational person would give. They gave less, on
the other hand, after rating themselves as more rational. This contrasts with the
results for givers who observed a keeper: they gave more after rating themselves
as more rational. Interestingly, the difference is consistent with the implications
of Bénabou and Tirole (2011), to the extent that givers who rated themselves
as more rational were more confident (making identity investments unnecessary)
after observing another giver than after observing a keeper.
the sample mean of X and σˆ is the sample standard deviation of X. With this normalization,
coefficients measure the expected change in the amount sent associated with a change in the
self-rating score of one standard deviation (at the mean of the other self-rating).
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Table 3.8: Tobit Regression for Amount Sent in Second Game: Givers Who Ob-
served a Giver
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. t p-value
Generosity -1.071 0.733 -1.46 0.156
Rationality -1.819** 0.851 -2.14 0.042
Genrational 1.316 0.904 1.46 0.157
Mingen 0.167 0.228 0.73 0.471
Maxrat 0.774*** 0.228 3.39 0.002
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Obs: 32
Table 3.9: Tobit Regression for Amount Sent in Second Game: Keepers Who
Observed a Keeper
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. t p-value
Generosity 0.269 0.565 0.48 0.637
Rationality -0.164 0.490 -0.34 0.739
Genrational 0.484 0.562 0.86 0.394
Mingen -0.274 0.281 -0.97 0.337
Maxrat 1.083*** 0.238 4.56 0.000
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Obs: 46
The two groups of keepers in the treatment condition (Tables 3.9 and 3.10) also
exhibited a strong positive relationship between their declared maximum amount
a rational person would send, and the amount they actually sent in the second
game. This was the only significant explanatory variable for both groups.9
9To explore the potential role of collinearity between explanatory variables, all the Tobit
regressions in Tables 3.7 to 3.10 were estimated again excluding the Mingen and Maxrat vari-
ables. We found the same pattern of signs and significance for the estimated coefficients, with
one exception: the coefficient for Rationality was no longer significant in the regression for givers
who observed a giver, corresponding to Table 3.8.
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Table 3.10: Tobit Regression for Amount Sent in Second Game: Keepers Who
Observed a Giver
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. t p-value
Generosity 0.294 0.612 0.48 0.635
Rationality 0.762 0.576 1.32 0.198
Genrational 0.113 0.643 0.17 0.863
Mingen 0.336 0.276 1.22 0.235
Maxrat 1.407*** 0.340 4.14 0.000
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Obs: 29
4. Conclusions
We have examined how inducing individuals to infer their identity from their
past behavior affects their subsequent decisions to cooperate. By asking them to
rate themselves, and a peer, on a "generosity" scale and on a "rationality" scale,
we focused the attention of subjects in the treatment condition on the identity
implications of behavior. We found that subsequent choices were consistent with
the implications of Bénabou and Tirole (2011).
Our main result is that individuals who behave generously and then observe a
peer who has behaved selfishly tend to behavemore generously after being induced
to estimate how generous and rational they and their peer were being, relative to a
control condition where subjects are not explicitly induced to make any inference
about their identity. The effect is economically important: average donations for
this group are 28% higher in the treatment than in the control condition. To
trace the causes of this effect, we examined subjects’ responses to the ratings
questions in the treatment condition. We found that givers who observe a keeper,
when asked to evaluate the peer and themselves, tend to rationalize the difference
in previous behavior by rating themselves as much more generous, and no less
rational - hence "superior" to their peer. However, this self-image construal has
an effect on preferences, since the psychological benefits from a positive self-image
as a rationally generous person would be undermined by subsequent behavior that
contradicted this perception. Hence preferences evolve, endogenously, towards
greater generosity. This is reflected in higher amounts being sent to partners
in the second game relative to the control condition, in which subjects are not
required to evaluate themselves and their peer, and therefore do not engage in the
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same self-image construal.
This interpretation is consistent with the finding that, within the group of
givers who observe a keeper, the ones who go on to donate most are precisely
those who have rated themselves as both rational and generous. Those who had
rated themselves as generous but irrational, on the other hand, donate least:
these subjects essentially felt like "suckers" (in the Jordan and Monin (2008)
terminology), and may have tried to make up for it by acting more "rationally"
in the second game.
The psychology of the givers who behaved more generously in the second game,
having rated themselves as rational and generous, deserves further study. Two
very different processes could be at work, with very different welfare implications.
One possibility is that the opportunity to justify behavior in the first game as
both generous and rational has a liberating effect, enabling the individual who
genuinely cares about collective welfare and efficiency to be more generous in the
second game without fear of coming across as a sucker or an idiot, or feeling
undue pressure to fall in line with a selfish peer. In this view, the individual
is made better off by being able to dig her heels and stick to her guns. The
second possibility is that individuals were not strongly motivated by a concern
for collective welfare and efficiency, but gave in the first game partly because of
image concerns (and optimistic expectations about their peers’ behavior): in this
case, observing divergent behavior by a peer could have a liberating effect - but
less so after individuals are led to rationalize their initial behavior relative to the
peer. In this view, individuals who play the rational generosity card to feel better
after the first game are then stuck with having to be consistent in the second
game, for fear of coming across as hypocritical otherwise. They are thus forced to
be generous, rather than liberated to be: noblesse oblige. This implies that they
might have been better off if they had not been induced to infer their identity
from their initial behavior. We leave it to future research to distinguish between
these two possibilities.
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6. Appendix
6.1. Experimental Instructions
Welcome; you are going to participate in an economics experiment. Your answers
and decisions will have no consequence for your grades or your degree.
This experiment studies decision-making. There are no correct or false answers
- you should simply decide according to your preferences.
This experiment will be remunerated. Your remuneration will depend on your
decisions and the decisions of the other participants. All amounts will be expressed
in units of experimental currency, or "points". One point is worth 50 (Euro)cents.
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We ask you to switch off your mobile phones and not to talk to each other
during the experiment. If you have a question, raise your hand and we will come
to answer.
Are there any questions now? If there are no questions, we can start. You
will see some instructions on your screen. Read them carefully. Whenever you
are asked a question, take the time you need to answer. If you see the phrase
"Waiting for other players" on your screen, it means you have to wait for the
others to give their answers before continuing.
6.1.1. General instructions
During this experiment you will sometimes be asked to take decisions that will
affect the outcome for you and for other participants. It is important to know
that your decisions will remain completely anonymous.
Each person will be assigned to a group of four participants, depending on the
ID you chose before the start of the experiment. You will never know who were
the other members of your group, and they will never know you were in their
group.
Within each group of four participants, there will be a participant "A", a
participant "B", a participant "C" and a participant "D". Each participant will
learn her role (A, B, C or D) shortly. When we refer to other members of your
group, we will always use the letter (A,B, C or D) and never their ID or other
information that could allow you to identify them.
If you have a question raise your hand. If there are no questions we can give
you the specific instructions.
6.1.2. Specific instructions
Now we give each participant an endowment of 12 points. In each group of four
participants, A has to decide how much to keep for herself, and how much to give
to B. At the same time, B has to decide how much to keep for herself, and how
much to give to A. Each person has to decide before knowing the other’s decision.
The same applies to participants C and D: C has to decide how much to keep for
herself, and how much to give to D. At the same time, D has to decide how much
to keep for herself, and how much to give to C.
Important: the amount received will be three times the amount given.
Example: if A gives 4 points, B will receive 12 points. If B gives 4 points, A will
receive 12 points.
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Decisions have to respect the following rules. Each participant can choose
between two options:
Option 1: He keeps his endowment of 12 points and gives nothing. In this case
the other receives nothing from him.
Option 2: He keeps 8 points and gives 4 points. In this case, the other receives
12 points from him.
[NEXT SCREENSHOT]
Instructions to A
[equivalent instructions were given to B, C and D]
You are participant A in your group. You now have an endowment of 12
points. You can choose between the following two options:
Option 1: you keep 12 points and give nothing. So B will receive nothing
from you.
Option 2: You keep 8 points and give 4 points. So B will receive 12 points
from you.
Reminder: B is also choosing between option 1 (giving you zero) and option
2 (giving you 4 points; in this case, you would receive 12 points).
Take the time you need to think before making your decision.
[NEXT SCREENSHOT]
Instructions to A
[equivalent instructions were given to B, C and D]
Now every member of your group has decided.
You have chosen:
either Option 1 (give zero to B) or Option 2 (give 4 points to B)
Participant C in your group has chosen:




[equivalent instructions were given to B, C and D]
You have given ?? points to B. At the same time, participant C has given ??
points to D.
In your opinion, which of the following would best describe participant C?
1. Very selfish
2. Quite selfish
3. A little selfish
4. Neither selfish nor generous.
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[equivalent instructions were given to B, C and D]
You have given ?? points to B. At the same time, participant C has given ??
points to D.
In your opinion, which of the following would best describe you?
1. Very selfish
2. Quite selfish
3. A little selfish
4. Neither selfish nor generous.






[equivalent instructions were given to B, C and D]
You have given ?? points to B. At the same time, participant C has given ??
points to D.
In your opinion, which of the following would best describe participant C?
1. Very rational
2. Quite rational
3. A little rational
4. Neither rational nor irrational.






[equivalent instructions were given to B, C and D]
You have given ?? points to B. At the same time, participant C has given ??
points to D.
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In your opinion, which of the following would best describe you?
1. Very rational
2. Quite rational
3. A little rational
4. Neither rational nor irrational.





If every participant had an endowment of 12 points and could choose freely
how much to keep for herself and how much to give to the other member of her
group (who would receive three times the amount given), what would be, in your
opinion, the minimum amount that a generous person would give?
[NEXT SCREENSHOT]
[treatment condition only]
If every participant had an endowment of 12 points and could choose freely how
much to keep for herself and how much to give to the other designated member
of her group (who would receive three times the amount given), what would be,
in your opinion, the maximum amount that a rational person would give?
[NEXT SCREENSHOT]
Now you are going to participate in a similar experiment, but with a different
group. In this new group, no participant will have played with you before. You
will not know how they played the first time, and they will not know how you
played the first time.
The size of each group will be the same: 4 participants.
In this second experiment, which will be the last, each participant will have a
new endowment of 12 points. He or she will be able to choose freely how much
to keep and how much to give to the other designated member of her group. At




[equivalent instructions were given to B, C and D]
You are participant A in your new group. You now have a new endowment of
12 points.
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You have to choose how much to keep for yourself, and how much to give to
participant B of your new group. The amount given will be multiplied by three.
Reminder: participant B of your new group is also choosing how much to
keep for herself and how much to give you.
Take the time you need to think before making your decision.
[NEXT SCREENSHOT]
[control condition only]
Now all the decisions have been taken.
In the first experiment, you kept ?? points of your endowment, and you
received ?? points.





[equivalent instructions were given to B, C and D]
In the first experiment, you gave ?? points to B. At the same time, participant
C gave ?? points to D.




3. A little selfish
4. Neither selfish nor generous.






[equivalent instructions were given to B, C and D]
In the first experiment, you gave ?? points to B. At the same time, participant
C gave ?? points to D.
In your opinion, which of the following would best describe you?
1. Very selfish
2. Quite selfish
3. A little selfish
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4. Neither selfish nor generous.






[equivalent instructions were given to B, C and D]
In the first experiment, you gave ?? points to B. At the same time, participant
C gave ?? points to D.




3. A little rational
4. Neither rational nor irrational.






[equivalent instructions were given to B, C and D]
In the first experiment, you gave ?? points to B. At the same time, participant
C gave ?? points to D.
In your opinion, which of the following would best describe you?
1. Very rational
2. Quite rational
3. A little rational
4. Neither rational nor irrational.





In the second experiment, every participant had an endowment of 12 points
and could choose freely how much to keep for herself and how much to give to the
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other member of her group (who received three times the amount given). In your




In the second experiment, every participant had an endowment of 12 points
and could choose freely how much to keep for herself and how much to give to the
other member of her group (who received three times the amount given). In your
opinion, what would be the maximum amount that a rational person would
give?
[NEXT SCREENSHOT]
Thank you for participating in the experiment. Please complete the following
questionnaire before leaving the laboratory.
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